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University of Chicago 
M URRAY ROTHBARD is a prominent spokesman for neo-Austrian eco- nomics, yet the economics profession has not taken him seriously 
enough to investigate his claims. He and his disciples invlte this neglect by 
treating the Rothbardian corpus more as creed-to-be-adhered-to than as 
the:ory-to-be:-tested-and-improved-on. The profession's neglect is nonethe- 
less unwise. Even if neo-Austrian economics turns out to be unsound, it 
should be taken seriously because of the growing number of intelligent 
people who identify themselves as Austrians. 
IRothbard's methodology is crucial to the soundness of his approach. It 
must be defended if he is to exempt himself from the formal and statistical 
standards of the rest of the profession. In several locations, Rothbard sets 
down the basic principles of his method,' but nowhere in enough detail to 
satisfy the unconvinced. Instead, he refers to eminent figures from the past in 
uhose works will presumably be found the missing links in his own exposi- 
tlon. To take Rothbard seriously, then, amounts to taking seriously his 
account of his intellectual ancestors. A critique of his account is not just of 
ialue for the light shed on his standards of historical research; more impor- 
tantly, since Rothbard relies on his ancestors to fill in his methodological 
gaps, it may shed light on the strength of the methodology on which he 
proposes to erect the neo-Austrian alternative. 
Rothbard claims that praxeology, which he identifies with "the 
~xiomatic-deductive method" in  economic^,^ has a long tradition. At the 
=ginning of that tradition he locates Jean-Baptiste Say, for whom praxeol- 
ag) "was the basic method." He goes on to state that Say was "perhaps the 
F k t  praxe~logist ."~ However, contrary to these claims, Say's Treatise on 
Pvlirical Ecolnomy lends itself only grudgingly to identification with 
Rd~bardian praxeology. Consider in evidence the following passage: 
In political economy, as in natural philosophy, and in every other 
study, systems have been formed before facts have been established; 
the place of the latter being supplied by purely gratuitous assertions. 
More recently, the inductive method of philosophizing, which, since 
the time of Bacon, has so much contributed to the advancement of every 
other science, has been applied to the conduct of our researches in this. 
The excellence of this method consists in only admitting facts carefully 
a* 
k f l  BeBP.,. ,n Pupers No. 5 (Wlnter 1979) 15-26. 
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observed, and the consequences rigorously deduced from them; 
thereby effectually excluding those prejudices and authorities which, in 
every department of literature and science, have so often been inter- 
posed between man and truth.4 
Surely here we have a sympathy with Baconian inductivism, which is 
incompatible with praxeology. 
Unfortunately, the limits of space do not permit a consideration of the 
lesser figures such as Cairnes and Senior whom Rothbard places next in the 
praxeological m ~ v e m e n t . ~  He maintains that several decades later, "during 
the 1870's and 1880's, . . . the praxeological method was carried on and 
further developed by the Austrian school, founded by Carl Menger of the 
University of Vienna."6 Menger is a major figure in anyone's history of 
thought, so it is worth considering whether he, more than Say, is a consistent 
proponent of the praxeological method. In this regard the following lines 
from Menger are illuminating: 
Nothing is so certain as that the results of the exact orientation of 
theoretical research appear insufficient and unempirical in the field of 
economy as in all other realms of the world of phenomena, when 
measured by the standard of realism. This is, however, self-evident, 
since the results of exact research, and indeed in all realms of the world 
of phenomena, are true only with certain presuppositions, with presup- 
positions which in reality do not always apply. . . . There is scarcely 
need to remark that the above presuppositions in real economy all hold 
only in rare cases and that therefore as a rule real prices deviate more or 
less from economic ones (those corresponding to the economic situa- 
tion). In the practice of economy people in fact endeavor only rarely to 
protect their economic interests completely. Many sorts of considera- 
tions, above all, indifference to economic interests of lesser signifi- 
cance, good will toward others, etc., cause them in their economic 
activity not to protect their economic interests at all in some cases, in 
some cases incompletely. They are, furthermore, vague and in error 
concerning the economic means to attain their economic goals; indeed, 
they are often vague and in error concerning these goals themselves. 
Also the economic situation, on the basis of which they develop their 
economic activity, is often insufficiently or incompletely known to 
them. Finally their economic freedom is not infrequently impaired by 
various kinds of relationships. A definite economic situation brings to 
light precisely economic prices of goods only in the rarest cases. Real 
prices are, rather more or less different from e c o n o m i ~ . ~  
Note that Menger is advocating what would today be called model 
building-working out the consequences of a set of presuppositions that are 
often lacking in reality. In this respect, though of course not in some others, 
Menger is closer to the methodology of Milton Friedman8 than to that of 
Rotlhbard. Ur~like other economists who either claim that "man is rational" 
is true but empty or who apologetically claim that it is false but empirical, the 
praxeologist claims that it is both true and empirical. Thus, in this vital 
respect Menger is no praxeologist. 
Contemporary praxeologists without exception acknowledge a 
methodological and substantive debt to Ludwig von Mises. He was both an 
advocate of tlie wordpraxeology and an exemplar of what it means. Mises 
was explicitly a Kantian in that he believed that important theoretical 
statements in economics are synthetic a priori and can be justified along 
Kant's line fior justifying such statements. That line consisted mainly of 
providng a "t:ranscendental deduction" of the twelve categories of thought 
(chief among them was "causation"-"action" was not included). The two 
versions of the deduction are among the most difficult reading in philosophy 
and have earned the gratitude of professors by providing an inexhaustible 
source of paper topics. What the deductions purport to do is to show that the 
categories are necessary presuppositions of our having any propositional 
knowledge at all. When the categories, so deduced, are applied to "the 
manifold of space and time" (which is, roughly, sense data or the given), the 
result is synthetic a priori statements, among the most notable examples of 
which are the axioms of Euclidean geometry. 
Lord Macaulay said of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that "1 tried to read 
i t ,  but found it utterly unintelligible, just as if it had been written in Sanscrit. 
Not one word of it gave me an idea except a Latin quotation from Persius. It 
seems to me that it ought to be possible to explain a true theory of 
metaphysics in words that I can ~nhers tand."~ Apart from its obscurity, 
Kam's position can he criticized on three main grounds. First, Kantians have 
never been able to agree on how many categories there are and on what they 
are. Second, Kant's prime example of synthetic a priori truths has been 
refuted. It was not just the development of non-Euclidean geometries by 
Lobachevsky and Riemann that caused the problem. The fatal blow came 
when Einstein found that the Reimannian geometry is compatible with 
relativity theory whereas Euclidean geometry is not.'' The third criticism of 
Kani's positioln is that it results in transcendental idealism. Although Kant 
cia~niled that his idealism is unobjectionable, it is difficult to see how it 
differs from tlhe more mundane variety. Both claim that men can have no 
knowledge of things-in-themselves, and both are hard put to avoid the 
&surd reduction to solipsism. 
Of the criticisms of Kant, only the third seems to have carried much 
uelght with modern praxe~logists .~ '  Even von Mises was concerned enough 
b> the charge of idealism to produce a defense against it: "Only those groups 
ciluld survive whose members acted in accordance with the right categories, 
1 e , with those that were in conformity with reality and therefore-to use the 
concept of pragmatism-worked. "I2 Thus, for von Mises natural selection 
I 
I 
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' ensures that our synthetic a priori knowledge is realistic. Ingenious as this 
defense is, it is apparently not ingenious enough to convince Rothbard and 
most other praxeologists to accept Kantianism as the philosophical under- 
pinnings of praxeology . 
Unfortunately, however, there is no account in Rothbard, comparable in 
scope and detail to von Mises's, of what the true underpinnings are. Occa- 
sionally Rothbard declares that he is an Aristotelian, but he only gives hints 
of what it is in Aristotle that he thinks relevant. In addition, he never 
considers whether in the relevant respects Aristotle's position may be subject 
to serious objections. Here, an attempt will be made to isolate and evaluate 
the aspects of Aristotle relevant to praxeology. Before doing this, however, 
it makes sense to examine three other methodologists whom Rothbard 
! 
quotes approvingly: Weber, Schutz, and Croce; for it may be that in the work 
of one of them will be found insights as to how Aristotle's philosophy is to 
relate to praxeology . 
Rothbard says that "the Austrians were endeavoring to construct a 'ver- 1 stehende' social science, the same ideal that Max Weber was later to 
1 uphold."13 The central concept of Weber's verstehende social science is the 
"ideal type." Weber provides this account of its characteristics: 
I An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more 
I points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, 
more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
1 
! phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly em- phasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedanken- 
I 
bild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) 
I 
I 
cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Histori- 
cal research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the 
! extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality, to what extent for example, the economic structure of a certain 
1 city is to be classified as a "city-economy . ' ' . . . It is possible, or rather, 
I it must be accepted as certain that numerous, indeed a very great many, 
1 utopias of this sort can be worked out, of which none is like another, I 
1 and none of which can be observed in empirical reality as an actually existing economic system, but each of which however claims that it is a 
I 
I representation of the "idea" of capitalistic culture. Each of these can 
I claim to be a representation of the "idea" of capitalistic culture to the 
extent that it has really taken certain traits, meaningful in their essential 
1 features, from the empirical reality of our culture and brought them 
1 
I together into a unified ideal-construct. For those phenomena which 
! interest us as cultural phenomena are interesting to us with respect to 
I very different kinds of evaluative ideas to which we relate them. 
I Inasmuch as the "points of view" from which they can become 
I / significant for us are very diverse, the most varied criteria can be 
\ 
I 




applied to the selection of the traits which are to enter into the construc- 
tion of an ideal-typical view of a particular culture.14 
As was the case with Menger,15 Weber is best seen as advocating what would 
today be called model building.16 Thus, as with Menger and Friedman, 
economic theory may contain important elements that are unrealistic. In an 
almost instrumentalist way, theories are to be judged by their relative 
applicability to the empirical facts, not on their strict truth or falsehood. For, 
strictly speaking, all ideal types are empirically false. Thus, Weber's ideal 
types are inconsistent with the claims that are made for the praxeological 
method. This is not to say that in actual fact von Mises and Rothbard do not 
in their economics use constructs that function as ideal types. In fact, the 
"evenly rotating econorny" is a perfect example of such a construction. Of 
this ideal type von Mises says: 
These insoluble contradictions, however, do not affect the service 
which this imaginary construct renders for the only problems for whose 
treatment it is both appropriate and indispensable: the problem of the 
relation between the prices of products and those of the factors required 
for their production, and the implied problems of entrepreneurship and 
of profit and loss.17 
But the use of ideal types by Austrian economists does not alter the fact that 
such constructs cannot consistently be part of the praxeological method. The 
praxeologist who saw this most clearly was von Mises himself in an early 
section of Human Action entitled "On Ideal Types. "I8 
The second methodologist whom Rothbard quotes approvingly is Alfred 
Schutz. In a discussion of our knowledge of human action Rothbard says: 
Alfred Schutz pointed out and elaborated the complexity of the interac- 
tion between the individual and other persons, the 'interpretive under- 
standing' or Verstehen , upon which this universal, prescientific knowl- 
edge rests. The common-sense knowledge of the universality of moti- 
vated, intentional human action, ignored by the positivists as 'unscien- 
tific,' actually provides the indispensable groundwork on which sci- 
ence itself must develop. lg  
1 The following shows Weber's ideal type to be at the core of Schutz's position: 
It is one of the outstanding features of modern social science to have 
described the device the social scientists use in building up their 
conceptual scheme, and it is the great merit of (Durkheim, Pareto, 
Marshall, Veblen, and) above all Max Weber, to have developed this 
technique in all its fullness and clarity. This technique consists in 
replacing the human beings which the social scientist observes as actors 
on the social stage by puppets created by himself, in other words, in 
constructing ideal types of actors.20 
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It has already been shown that the Weberian ideal type is a nonpraxeological 
concept. But Schutz tries to do more than just reiterate Weber's theory. He 
seeks to elaborate and secure it by applying to it the phenomenological 
analysis of Edmund Husserl. Husserl sought to get to the true essence of 
phenomena by "bracketing out" all the common beliefs of everyday life. 
After the philosopher had succeeded in systematically ignoring all of our 
everyday beliefs, he then would be able to intuit the essence of phenomena in 
their unpolluted purity. Consider what Husserl would have us bracket out: 
The whole world as placed within the nature-setting and presented in 
experience as real, taken completely "free from all theory," just as it is 
in reality experienced, and made clearly manifest in and through the 
linkings of our experiences, has now no validity for us, it must be set in 
brackets, untested indeed but also uncontested. Similarly all theories 
and sciences, positivistic or otherwise, which relate to this world, 
however good they may be, succumb to the same fate.21 
The question, of course, is how with all this in brackets anything intelligible 
can be said about what is left. Jeff Bedrick of the Chicago Philosophy 
Department tells the story of how as a boy Husserl had beengiven a knife. He 
decided that he wanted to get it really sharp, so he got a whet-stone and 
started grinding. Never satisfied that he had gotten the knife sharp, he kept 
grinding until he had nothing left. Later in life Husserl said that he some- 
times felt that he had done the same thing with his philosophy. 
To the extent that Schutz is Weberian, he is nonpraxeological; to the 
extent that he is Husserlian, he is at best obscure. 
The final methodologist to be considered before focusing on Aristotle is 
Benedetto Croce. He had, according to Rothbard, "his own highly de- 
veloped praxeological position. "'' Among the more illuminating of Croce's 
comments on economics are those following his endorsement of the similar- 
ity of mechanics and economics: 
Mechanics are nothing but the complex of formulae of calculation 
constructed on reality, which is Spirit and Becoming in Metaphysic, 
and may be abstracted and falsified in Science, so as to assume the 
aspect of Force or a system of forces, for the convenience of calcula- 
tion. Economy does the same thing, when it cuts off from the volitional 
acts certain groups, which it simplifies and makes rigid with the 
definition of the "economic man," the laws of "least means," and the 
like. And owing precisely to this mechanicizing process of economic 
Science, it is ingenuous to ask oneself why ethical, logical, or aesthetic 
facts are not included in Economy, and in what way they can be 
included. Economic science is the sum of abstractive operations ef- 
fected upon the concept of Will or Action, which is thus quantified.23 
This passage bears out the summary of Croce's position on economics that is 
presented by H. S. Harris: 
In spite of Croce's insistence that the "utility" of the economists is a 
fu:ndamental philosophical category, his logic does not allow the ad- 
mission of economics itself as a genuine philosophical science. The 
work of economists, like that of all other scientists, belongs to the 
caitegory of utility itself, not to that of truth. "Economic man" is a 
paradigm case of a pseudo concept '* 
Since the praxeologist wants to consider economic theorems not just useful 
but also true, Croce is not a praxeologist. 
It had been hoped that by looking at other methodologists of whom 
Rothbard approves, it might be possible to gain an insight into the sense in 
H hich he considers himself an Aristotelian. Unfortunately, this hope has not 
k e n  fulfilled. So it is necessary to look directly at Aristotle to see if he was in 
m:y respect a proto-praxeologist. 
'The first difficulty that arises is the well-known apparent inconsistency 
wlween Aristotle's theory of science in the Organon and his actual practice 
ai it in such works as the Historia Animaliurn. In the theory, Aristotle saw 
Kience as demon~strative, while in practice he relied much more on induc- 
:,an. Th~e distinction is not clear-cut, however, since even in the Organon 
4rlstotle saw a role for induction, problematic though that role may be.25 
6 arlous attempts have been made to reconcile theory and practice, one of the 
m a t  plausible of which claims that Aristotle saw the syllogistic only as the 
n:shr effective method of teaching the truth, while careful observation is the 
r a p e r  inethod alf arriving at it.26 But this reconciliation could not be 
dcepteci by a praxeologist, for he wants to claim that deduction is more than 
a reaching device, being at the very least a method of justification and, 
;-.<reby, of arriving at the truth. So the praxeologist must choose between 
ra i l  .%n~totles, opting of course for the Aristotle of the Organon. This is the 
k~3rotle of the demonstration, for whom, as Ross notes, "demonstration is 
%+r:nufic ~ y l l o g i s m . " ~ ~  In the actual work of praxeologists not even the 
&*rc theory of demand has been formalized syllogistically. But if Aristotle 
a :J se brought into the praxeological camp, the praxeologists will have to 
~ ~ ~ ~ i r  that such formalization is possible and, for the sake of demonstrative - - - -  - -&a ancl clarity, desirable. Whether Rothbard, at least, would be willing to 
-LC  IS admission is doubtful. He comes out against formalization in 
f modem !symbolic logic, opting instead for what he calls "verbal 
"' This "verbal logic" might mean the syllogistic, but it probably 
ince Rothbard seems to think that he and the praxeologists have 
hieved all the necessary rigor. 
stotle is not to be followed in his syllogistic method, then perhaps the 
f his philolsophy that is to support praxeology is his justification of 
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first principles. Rothbard has claimed that the first principle of praxeology 
-"man acts''-is self-evidently true." He believes that there is a specific 
sort of argument in Aristotle that can be used to demonstrate the self- 
evidence of this principle.30 Aristotle had argued that the man who denies the 
law of noncontradiction contradicts himself since, by making an assertion, 
he presupposes the validity of the law.31 Similarly, Rothbard argues: 
A . . . self-contradiction faces the man who attempts to refute the axiom 
of human action. For in doing so, he is ipso facto a person making a 
conscious choice of means in attempting to arrive at an adopted end: in 
this case the end, or goal, of trying to refute the axiom of action. He 
employs action in trying to refute the notion of action.3z 
This argument is persuasive, but it is important to be clear on exactly how 
much or how little it proves. The axiom "man acts" is vague in many 
respects. Does it assert that all men act, or only some? Does it assert that each 
acting man acts all of the time, or does it allow for nonacting behavior? Most 
importantly of all, what meaning of the word action does it presuppose? The 
meaning and implications of this concept are notoriously difficult to pin 
down, as evidenced by the number of recent books that have attempted, 
without reaching consensus, to do so.33 
What is sought from the wide range of possible interpretations of the 
action axiom is the strongest one provable by the Aristotelian argument. 
Now a person who denies the action axiom is himself intentionally doing 
something at aparticular time. So he does not contradict himself if he either 
denies that all men sometimes act or that any manalways acts. In short, what 
the Aristotelian argument proves is the following: the statement "some men 
sometimes do things intentionally" cannot be consistently denied. This 
statement is in turn a formal tautology, since it depends for its truth upon a 
"denial" being defined as an intentional action. Whether from this base 
anything of interest can be inferred (all of economics, say) is another 
question. 
The results of this paper may be summarized briefly. First, Rothbard's 
account of his intellectual ancestry is inaccurate or subject to much qualifi- 
cation. Second, there are good grounds for doubting that a sound philosophi- 
cal defense of Rothbard's praxeology can be given. On the latter point, much 
more can be said, but here only a final caveat is in order. A refutation of 
Rothbard's methodology should in no way detract from the insights and 
substantive work of other economists who identify themselves as Austrians. 
Israel Kirzner's analysis of entrepreneurship, Gerald O'Driscoll's treatment 
of credit cards, F. A. Hayeks's business cycle theory, Laurence Moss's 
research on the history of economic thought, and Mario Rizzo's work on 
crime34 all deserve fuFther attention. 
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